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LA FOLLE7TE'S FOLLY: A CRITIQUE OF PARTY
ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS IN PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION POLITICS
Alan Martinson*
Every four years, observers of the presidential nomination season decry the undue
influence of those states that hold their primaries first, particularly Iowa and New
Hampshire. Currently, Democratic Party rules protect the position of these states.
In 2008, two states disregarded party rules in order to move their primaries to a
more influential position in the primary season. As punishment for disobeying the
rules, the national party diluted the influence of the delegates from these states at
the national convention. Legislative solutions to the problems of the current nomi-
nation process appear unlikely. Moreover, Supreme Court jurisprudence places no
limits on a party's choice to refuse to seat delegates. This Note proposes that the
Court evaluate state regulation of parties more seriously with respect to presidential
nomination conventions by balancing the burden on the party ' associational
rights against the state's interest in regulation.
INTRODUCTION
The 2008 presidential primary season produced its share of sur-
prises, with the outcome of both parties' nomination battles
unsettled well beyond traditionally early contests in Iowa and New
Hampshire. Not surprising, however, was the iron fist with which
the national parties controlled the nomination process. For dec-
ades, national party control has meant favoritism of certain states
over others. Although New Hampshire is given free reign to
schedule its primary as early as its Secretary of State desires, and
Iowans have their votes counted just days after the New Year, resi-
dents of other states can only hope to influence the nomination
process if the battle remains unsettled beyond those first primaries.
The fortuity of the 2008 contest, and the systemic problems it un-
masked, do not diminish the concerns regarding the privileged
position that party rules-particularly the Democrats-afford cer-
tain states at the expense of everyone else.
As it is every four years, supposedly quasi-sovereign states have
been effectively powerless against the two major political parties.
* University of Michigan Law School, J.D. 2008; Claremont McKenna College, B.A.
2004. Thanks to Professor Ellen Katz for helping me develop my ideas and for providing
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States attempting to break the stranglehold in 2008 received harsh
punishments. Michigan moved its primary up to mid-January, only
to have the Democrats initially strip the state of all of its delegates
and the Republicans allow only half the original number.' Florida
moved its primary up to late-January, with the same result.2 Frus-
trated politicians and voters filed lawsuits challenging the
draconian punishments, 3 but the current law regarding the associa-
tional rights of parties made their claims difficult.4 While Michigan
and Florida were later able to regain their delegates (though with
only half a vote each), they did so under circumstances that en-
sured that they would have no impact on the outcome and did not
change the underlying policy favoring Iowa and New Hampshire.!
Indeed, the Supreme Court has progressively strengthened the
associational rights of parties in determining the method for
choosing their nominees, even in the face of state opposition.'
While states have power to force parties to hold primaries for can-
didates who will appear on the states' general election ballots,7
their power does not extend much further. Particularly, national
parties possess practically unfettered control of presidential nomi-
nation procedures and, indeed, full authority to blackmail states
into following party procedures, as the Court has noted on several
occasions." During the 2008 election cycle, another dimension of
party control came to the forefront: Party rules allowing certain
1. Salena Zito, Michigan, Florida Bitter Over Delegate Losses, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-
REvIEW, Jan. 20, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/
news/s_548402.html.
2. Id. The Democratic Rules Committee eventually met in May of 2008 to decide what
to do with the Michigan and Florida delegations. In the interests of party unity and har-
mony, the Democrats decided to reinstate each state's delegates for the Convention, but
with only half a vote for each delegate. Katharine Q. Seelye & Jeff Zeleny, Democrats Approve
Deal on Michigan and Florida, N.Y. TIMES,June 1, 2008, at Al.
3. Complaint, Nelson v. Dean, No. 4:07-CV-427 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007); Complaint,
DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., No. 8:07-CV-1552 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2007). Both cases
have since been dismissed. Nelson v. Dean, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2007); DiMaio v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., No. 8:07-CV-1552 (M.D. Fla. 2007). On appeal, the 11th Circuit
dismissed the DiMaio case for lack of standing. DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 520 F.3d
1299, 1303 (11 th Cir. 2008). Regardless, the DiMaio case is not directly relevant to the argu-
ment in this Note, as the plaintiff therein alleges that the party rules violate individual Equal
Protection rights, rather than state interests in regulating elections. Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant at 11-12, DiMaio v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299 (l1th Cir. 2008) (No.
07-14816-B). Nelson does raise some relevant issues and is discussed below. See infra Part IV.B.
4. See Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
5. Seelye & Zeleny, supra note 2.
6. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000); Tashjian v. Republican
Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986); La Follette, 450 U.S. 107; Cousins %% Wigoda, 419 U.S.
477 (1975).
7. Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
8. See La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124-26; Cousins, 419 U.S. at 487-91.
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states permission to hold early primaries, while discriminating
against all other states, caused political controversy.9 Nonetheless,
the relevant precedent is broad enough to protect the parties' ac-
tions.
This Note questions the soundness of applying precedent on
party associational rights to the controversy regarding presidential
primary dates. The present nomination system results from histori-
cal accident and subsequent entrenchment, not calculated party
activity. It discriminates against governments and citizens of other
states, without adequate justification. Although in many respects
parties should enjoy broad powers to choose their standard-bearer,
the states' role and interest in the election of the President dictates
that parties should only be able to impose generally-applicable
rules on states. To that end, the Supreme Court should more ex-
plicitly balance the burden on the party's associational rights
against the state's interest in regulation. Specifically, the Court
should give parties less deference with respect to delegate seating,
and consider the circumstances and relative interests at stake in
the clash between the party and the states.
Part I outlines the history of party nomination contests in this
country, with particular emphasis on Iowa and New Hampshire.
Part II discusses the current political issues surrounding the presi-
dential nomination process, including the front-loading problem,
special privileges early states enjoy, and the prospect of political
solutions. Part III addresses the current state of the law of party asso-
ciational rights with a focus on the La Follette case. Part IV analyzes
how the relevant precedents apply to the present issue-particularly
the Democratic Party rules-and suggests recommendations about
how the Supreme Court should modify its constitutional jurispru-
dence in this area.
I. HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION CONTESTS
The nomination process both parties use to select their presi-
dential candidates, consisting primarily of caucuses and primaries,
is the product of progressive democratization. In reaching the cur-
rent system, however, quirky relics of past practices persist.
9. See DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 2008 DE-
MOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, Rule llA (2006) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC RULES],
available at http://www.demconvention.com /a/2007/O3/delegate-select.html.
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A. Evolution of the Nomination Process
Early in American history, the newly formed Federalist and De-
mocratic-Republican parties sought to develop a system for
selecting their respective presidential candidates. Their considera-
tions were similar to considerations parties face today: They wanted
to maintain control of the nominating process, while also encour-
aging ultimate party unity.10
The Democratic-Republicans first solved the dilemma in 1800 by
enlisting Members of Congress to caucus and select a nominee,
and leaving the Federalists to slowly dissolve.11 In 1824, however,
the caucus process broke down, leading to a highly contested gen-
eral election with no clear winner.1 2 Andrew Jackson's populist
ascendancy emboldened his supporters to create a convention-
based system of nominations, breaking elites' stranglehold on the
process.13 The new system, with its more decentralized and popular
orientation, fit within the larger Jacksonian march toward a "politi-
cal nation. 14 Nonetheless, the selection process still did not
include direct elections; rather, the power severely shifted from the
elites to local and state party organizations. 5 Consequently, differ-
ent means of selecting delegates for the national convention
proliferated, some of which were more or less open and transpar-
ent.1 6 Generally, caucuses or party leaders (such as the governor or
party bosses) chose delegates. 7 Delegates were supposed to repre-
sent states' interests at the convention, where they would select
candidates in infamous "smoke-filled back rooms."
8
In the late 1800s, larger political movements were brewing that
would ultimately change the nomination process. Political partici-
pation in the nominating process declined, and observers
wondered what had gone wrong.' 9 Progressive Era reformers
viewed many of the electoral mechanisms in the United States, in-
cluding the nomination process, as corrupt and insular, so they
10. DANTE J. SCALA, STORMY WEATHER: THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY AND PRESI-
DENTIAL POLITICS 6 (2003).
11. Id.
12. Id. AndrewJackson won the popular vote, butJohn Quincy Adams ultimately pre-
vailed in a vote of the House of Representatives.
13. Id. at 7.
14. ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND
TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH 65 (2002).
15. SCALA, supra note 10, at 7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. WARE, supra note 14, at 65-68.
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demanded change. ° One major reform was the Australian (or "se-
cret") ballot, which wrestled control from party bosses and
fundamentally transformed politics from a "face-to-face" endeavor
to a more formal process.21 Another was the general shift from in-
direct to direct methods of selecting candidates and public
officials. Over time, the direct primary changed from a radical
method of selecting candidates in just a few jurisdictions to more
widespread acceptance. The direct election of Senators also pro-
vides an obvious example of this trend.23
The turn of the 20th Century brought the first direct primaries
for presidential convention delegates when, in 1901, a Florida law
allowed parties to elect delegates to their national elections via
24primaries. In 1905, Wisconsin passed a law requiring parties to
use primaries in selecting delegates. 5 Oregon, in 1910, became the
first state to require its delegates to support the winner of its presi-
dential preference primary at the party convention.26 Many other
states followed Oregon's lead, including New Hampshire, 27 al-
though these states remained a minority until the post-1968
McGovern-Fraser reforms.28 The move to primaries, however, had
relatively little effect on the party conventions, as the number of
primaries was insufficient to select a nominee; candidates were still
chosen in backroom negotiations among uncommitted delegates.20
Nonetheless, the pre-McGovern-Fraser primaries served as an im-
portant precursor to the current system and influenced the
structure that followed.30
Following controversy surrounding Hubert Humphrey's careful
use of party rules to secure the 1968 nomination, the Democratic
Party created the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Se-
lection (later the McGovern-Fraser Commission) to address
nomination issues.31 The Commission changed party rules to give
20. Id.
21. Id. at 33-34.
22. See id. at 95-128.
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
24. WARE, supra note 14, at 248.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. NIALL A. PALMER, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL
PROCESS 1 (1997).
28. WARE, supra note 14, at 248.
29. Id. at 250-51.
30. This is not to say that the primaries were irrelevant before 1972; a victory in the
primaries undoubtedly added to the sense that a candidate could gain support among the
general voting population. SCALA, supra note 10, at 9. They were simply not determinative.
31. Id. at 14-15.
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increased incentives for primaries, at the expense of caucuses."
The Republicans, fearing being left out of the increased media at-
tention that accompanies primaries, soon followed suit. 3
This is more or less the state of the presidential nominating sys-
tem today. 4 But several predictable changes have unfolded in the
past forty years. First, there has been significant front-loading in
the presidential nomination process. Early primary victories often
give candidates momentum that can carry them all the way to the
nomination. As a result, states wishing to have more say in the
nomination move up their primaries to have more influence. This
phenomenon began slowly, as only a few states challenged New
Hampshire's position as the first primary, and the nomination
process remained diffuse for several decades.' In 1988, a group of
Southern states established a "Super Tuesday" collection of prima-
ries early in the season, which further advanced the nomination
process.36 By 1996, over two-thirds of the Republican delegates were
selected by the sixth week of the primary season.37 By 2000, many
states held primaries and caucuses at the earliest date allowed by
the parties. 38 The 2008 season saw states schedule primaries even
earlier, with some states even challenging party rules penalizing
early primary dates.39
Second, parties institutionalized dates on which primaries can
be held. For example, the Democrats strictly forbid states from
holding primaries prior to the first Tuesday of February, with spe-
cific exceptions for four states, including Iowa and New
Hampshire.4 0 Republican rules also penalize states for holding early
32. WARE, supra note 14, at 252.
33. Id. at 253.
34. Party rules have changed in numerous ways following the reforms, but the struc-
ture remains the same, with the primaries producing a clear winner for each party in
advance of the conventions. Id.
35. WILLIAM G. MAYER & ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE FRONT-LOADING PROBLEM IN PRESI-
DENTIAL NOMINATIONS 8-13 (2004).
36. Id. at 13-15.
37. Id. at 16-17.
38. Id. at 16-18.
39. See FLA. STAT. § 103.101(1) (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 168.613a (West Supp.
2008).
40. DEMOCRATIC RULES, supra note 9, Rule llA ("No meetings, caucuses, conventions
or primaries which constitute the first determining stage in the presidential nomination
process (the date of the primary in primary states, and the date of the first tier caucus in
caucus states) may be held prior to the first Ttesday in February.... Provided, however, that
the Iowa precinct caucuses may be held no earlier than 22 days before the first Tuesday in
February; that the Nevada first-tier caucuses may be held no earlier than 17 days before the
first Tuesday in February; that the New Hampshire primary may be held no earlier than 14
days before the first Tuesday in February; and that the South Carolina primary may be held
no earlier than 7 days before the first Tuesday in February. In no instance may a state which
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primaries, but they do not allow exceptions for particular states.4'
Therefore, the Republican Party rules are less objectionable from a
fairness perspective.
In sum, developments in the primary process, both party-created
and naturally-occurring, have promoted early primaries. Democ-
rats have gone even further by specifically granting exemptions
from party rules on primary dates to certain states.
B. Iowa
Iowa benefits from a tradition of holding the "first in the nation"
presidential caucus. Caucuses are complex, organized processes
unfolding over many months, and Iowa is no exception. No state,
however, begins the delegate selection process before Iowa. Al-
though this situation results more from happenstance than logic,
Iowa's status now appears enshrined in modern political lore.
Although Iowa has held caucuses for the selection of national
party convention delegates for the entirety of its state history save
one year, its early contests are a relatively new development.4 2 In
1972, the Iowa Democratic Party moved its caucus to January 24,
not in an effort to have an early impact on the race, but rather to
enable party workers to process paper work for each progressive
stage of the caucuses to compensate for an unusually early (July 9)
scheduled delegate selection procedures on or between the first Tuesday in February and
the second Tuesday inJune 1984 move out of compliance with the provisions of this rule.").
41. REPUBLICAN NAT'L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, Rule 15(b) (2004)
[hereinafter REPUBLICAN RULES], available at http://www.gop.com/About/Rulesll-20.htm
("(1) Except with respect to delegates and alternate delegates elected under paragraph
(c) (1)(ii) of this rule and if consistent with paragraph (d)(4) of this rule: (i) No presidential
primary, caucus, convention, or other meeting may be held for the purpose of voting for a
presidential candidate and/or selecting delegates or alternate delegates to the national
convention, prior to the first Tuesday of February in the year in which the national conven-
tion is held.... ."). The party rules go on to state: "If any state or state party violates the Rules
of the Republican Party relating to the timing of the selection process resulting in the elec-
tion of delegates or alternate delegates to the next national convention, such state shall
suffer a loss of its delegates and alternate delegates to that national convention as follows:
(1) If a state or state party violates the Rules of the Republican Party relating to the timing of
the selection process resulting in the election of delegates or alternate delegates to the na-
tional convention before the call to the national convention is issued, then the number of
delegates to the national convention from that state shall be reduced by fifty percent (50%),
and the corresponding alternated delegates shall also be reduced." Id., Rule 16(a).
42. Peverill Squire, Iowa and the Nomination Process, in THE IOWA CAUCUSES AND THE
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS 1-3 (Peverill Squire ed., 1989). The only exception was
1916. Iowa changed back to a caucus for the next cycle because only a quarter of registered
voters had participated in the primary. A Complete Histoiy of the Iowa Caucuses, THE GAZETTE
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Dec. 27, 2006, http://www.iowacaucus.com/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20061227/IOWACAUCUS03/61227001.
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Democratic National Convention.4 3 The caucuses did not gain sig-
nificant national attention, but the attention they did get
convinced Democratic and Republican leaders in the state to co-
operate in holding early primaries in 1976, on January 19.44 When
Jimmy Carter invested significant resources in the state that year,
achieving a win that propelled him into front runner status, Iowa's
place of significance was set.
45
The significance of the caucuses, at least in the minds of candi-
dates and the media, has increased in the last thirty years.
Candidates invest significant resources46 and alter their policy posi-
47tions to appeal to Iowans. Predictably, Iowa has fought hard to
maintain its status as "first in the nation,, 4s and it has enjoyed suc-
cess in doing so-particularly in the Democratic Party, where its
position is protected by party rules.49
C. New Hampshire
New Hampshire has firmly rooted its position as the first primary
of the presidential nominating season for many years.50 Like Iowa,
New Hampshire's move to an early date was not an attempt to gain
influence, but rather an attempt at administrative efficiency. In
1916, officials moved the primary to the second Tuesday in March
to coincide with Town Meeting Day, making New Hampshire the
second primary in the nation. l When Indiana moved its primary to
a later date in 1920, New Hampshire became the first primary,
43. SquiRE, supra note 42, at 1-2.
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 3.
46. One economist estimated the economic impact of the caucuses (in 2004) at $50 to
$60 million. Iowa Caucus 2008, About the Iowa Caucuses, http://www.iowacaucus.org/
iacaucus.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008). In 2008, the numbers are estimated to be much
higher. Such spending results from substantial candidate spending on advertising and staff,
as well as news coverage of the caucuses. Presidential hopefuls spent about $40 million on
advertising in 2008. Alexander Mooney, $40 Million Spent to Tout Candidates on Iowa TV, CNN
PoLrTIcs,Jan. 1, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/01/01/iowa.ad.spending/.
47. One well-known example is the propensity of Presidential candidates to come out
in support of ethanol fuel to appeal to Iowa voters. See, e.g., Amy Lorentzen, White House
Hopefuls Love Iowa Ethanol, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2007, http://vw.usatoday.com/
news/politics/elecion2008/2007-8-30-ethanol-candidatesN.htm.
48. MAYER & BuSCH, supra note 35, at 160-61.
49. DEMOCRATIC RuTEs, supra note 9, Rule 1 A. Note that the Republican Party strips
all early states of half of their delegates, but candidates still focus their energy on those
states. REPUBLICAN RuLEs, supra note 41, Rule 16(a).
50. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51. SCALA, supra note 10, at 9. Town Meeting Day was the day New Hampshire resi-
dents weighed in on local issues via local democracy. Id.
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where it remains today.-2 Indeed, New Hampshire law dictates that
the state be first in the nation.
The New Hampshire primary has played an important role in
presidential nomination contests. The primary was first thrust into
the spotlight in 1952, when Eisenhower's win (despite remaining
in Paris and not campaigning in the state54) propelled him to the
Republican nomination, and Sen. Estes Kefauver's shocking victory
over incumbent President Harry Truman pushed Truman to forgo
re-election.55 The state's importance to candidates grew over the
next several election cycles, until 1968, when Richard Nixon (who
had invested significant time in New Hampshire in various roles
since 195456 ) demolished his opposition, clearing the Republican
field, and Eugene McCarthy's remarkable second-place finish set in
motion President Johnson's withdrawal from the race. 57 By 1972,
with New Hampshire as the first primary in a process increasingly
reliant on primaries, the state's place as a proving ground and most
critical stage for presidential hopefuls was set.5 Although history
has shown the contest to be influential, it is not always decisive, as
evidenced by big wins by the likes of Gary Hart in 1984"), John
McCain in 200060, and Hillary Clinton in 2008.61
More than Iowa, New Hampshire worked to maintain its posi-
tion in the presidential nomination season. For example, state
Republicans successfully fought off Arizona and Delaware's 1996
attempts to take over the first spot by demanding that all major
candidates sign a pledge to support New Hampshire's position as
62the first primary. The Secretary of State has said he would do
52. Id.
53. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 653:9 (2008) ("Presidential Primary Election-The presi-
dential primary election shall be held on the second Tuesday in March or on a date selected
by the secretary of state which is 7 days or more immediately preceding the date on which
any other state shall hold a similar election, whichever is earlier, of each year when a presi-
dent of the United States is to be elected or the year previous.").
54. CHARLES BRERETON, FIRST IN THE NATION: NEW HAMPSHIRE AND THE PREMIER
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY 13 (1987).
55. PALMER, supra note 27, at 3-6.
56. BRERETON, supra note 54, at 38-40, 60-61, 114-15.
57. Id. at 131-34.
58. PALMER, supra note 27, at 13.
59. Id. at 19-21.
60. SCALA, supra note 10, at 31.
61. Sarah Liebowitz, Democrats Pick Clinton, CONCORD MONITOR, Jan. 9, 2008, http://
www.concordmonitor.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080109/FRONTPAGE/801090381.
62. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 163-64.
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whatever it took to ensure that the state went first.63 Like Iowa,
Democratic rules protect New Hampshire's election date."
Prior to the 1984 nominating season, the state fought an epic
battle with the national Democratic Party to receive and extend a
special exemption for the state to hold an early primary. Party
rules had allowed the state party to hold its primary on the first
Tuesday in March, but state law set a primary date on the last day
of February.66 The primary was originally set for March 6, which fit
within the exemption window, but Vermont decided to hold a pri-
mary on the same date, triggering New Hampshire's law requiring
it to hold the first primary. 7 After a standoff, the national party ul-
timately capitulated (in part because the earlier primary date was
out of the state party's control), making the national party wary of
future confrontations. 6
D. Nevada and South Carolina
Nevada and South Carolina do not have as long of a tradition of
holding early primaries, but their current position is worth men-
tioning. Democratic Party rules grant these states favored positions
on the nomination calendar,69 and they both held early contests
(for both parties) in 2008. For 2008, the Democrats granted South
Carolina and Nevada early dates in order to include more African-
Americans and Latinos in the process, as well as to increase geo-
graphic diversity.7 Besides Iowa and New Hampshire, Nevada and
South Carolina are the only states allowed to have first determining
stages for delegates prior to the first Tuesday in February. The non-
discriminatory Republican rules strip these early states of half of
their delegates.71
63. Joel Achenbach, A December Primary in New Hampshire?: It's His Call, WASH. POST,
Oct. 12, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/10/11 /AR2007101102109.html.
64. DEMOCRATIC RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1 A.
65. PALMER, supra note 27, at 137-46; see also infra Part II.A.
66. PALMER, supra note 27, at 137-42.
67. Id. at 139-43. The Vermont Democratic Primary did not trigger the New Hamp-
shire law, as it was just a "beauty contest," where no delegates were selected. The Vermont
Republican primary, howvever, had the potential to select delegates, which triggered the New
Hampshire law. Id.
68. Id. at 143-46.
69. DEMOCRATIC RULES, supra note 9, Rule I IA.
70. Chris Cillizza & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Democrats Tweak the Primary Calendar, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2006, at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/art;cle/2006/07/22/AR2006072200640.html.
71. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 41, Rule 16(a).
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II. POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE NOMINATION PROCESS
While the current situation favoring the four early states arose
and remained in place for a variety of reasons, there are important
reasons why many states and the parties have an interest in chang-
ing the system. Voters in disfavored states also have an interest in
increasing their influence on the process. There is also little reason
to believe that the several favored states do a particularly good job
of selecting candidates who can win a general election or govern
effectively. Consequently, every four years, commentators discuss
potential political changes to the process. Unfortunately, they gen-
erally all reach the same conclusion: political reform in this area is
nearly impossible.
A. Front-Loading and the Role of Party Rules
As discussed above, party rules play a key role in maintaining the
position of the early primary states. Moreover, the reasons and his-
tory behind those rules remain relevant to this day and inform any
potential reform.
States have an obvious interest in voting early in the nominating
72process. Front-loading has increased dramatically in recent years.
And it makes a lot of sense for states to go early in the process; they
receive increased press coverage, an economic boost, candidate
attention, policy concessions, and, of course, influence on the
nomination. Indeed, the influence of the early states is empha-
sized by the number of candidates who drop out of the presidential
nominating context after losing an early state.7 By the time the
later states vote, only one viable candidate may remain.
The continuous march toward front-loading persists. Super
Tuesday, the first day both parties allow primaries and caucuses
without penalty or special exemption,75 gets more crowded every
four years. In 2008, twenty-two states held Democratic primaries
on Super Tuesday, accounting for fifty-two percent of the Democ-
ratic delegates, while twenty-one held Republican primaries,
accounting for forty-one percent of Republican delegates. 71 With
72. MAYER & BuscH, supra note 35, at 4-22.
73. Id. at 23-30.
74. Id. at 40-46.
75. DEMOCRATIC RuLEs, supra note 9, Rule IlA; REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 41,
Rule 15(a).
76. Dan Balz, Feb. 5 Primaries to Pose A Super Test of Strategy, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2008, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/14/
AR2008011402926_pf.html.
FALL 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
the nomination potentially decided by the second week of Febru-
ary, later states have very little say in the process, and remaining
states will likely move their primary dates to Super Tuesday. Of
course, when all the states have moved earlier, they will face a clas-
sic "tragedy of the commons," as the states will no longer be
differentiated from each other, and derive no benefit from their
early date."
The two major political parties have an interest in combating
front-loading of presidential primaries, given the way the nominat-
ing season tests the candidates' political abilities. In this way, the
Democrats' decision to allow four states to go first makes sense. It
is much better for the party to test the candidates over a series of
primaries and caucuses, rather than a single date with a large per-
centage of the delegates chosen. Thus, the front-loading problem
is inextricably tied to the early state exemption problem. Once the
early state exemption problem is solved, more comprehensive solu-
tions to the front-loading problem will enter the realm of
possibility.
8
The parties also have a strong interest in preventing states from
going too early in the process. If states were voting in November of
the prior year to nominate a candidate running in a presidential
election twelve months later, for example, the resulting candidate
might not still be considered the best candidate for the party the
following November. This is always a problem, even in a system
with somewhat later primaries, but extremely early dates exacer-
bate the problem.
As a result of this interest in limiting the move toward earlier
primaries, the parties instituted the rules setting Super Tuesday as
the first day for primary contests. 79 This seems reasonable (and
clearly supported by the case law), given that this rule is non-
discriminatory against states and advances legitimate party con-
cerns; in other words, the balancing of interests clearly favors the
party. Moreover, the Republican rule simply penalizing all states
violating the prohibition on early primaries8' passes the same test.
The Republican rule effectively limits the effect of front-loading by
requiring states to choose between early influence and a full slate
77. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 49-50.
78. For examples of solutions that would prove more feasible without the Democrats'
early state exemptions, see infra Part II.C and the sources cited therein.
79. DEMOCRATIC RULES, supra note 9, Rule IlA; REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 41,
Rule 15(a).
80. See infra Part I1I.C.
81. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 41, Rule 15(a).
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of delegates. It is the Democratic rule, meanwhile, which raises the
most concerns about fairness.
Democratic Party Rule 11A has a controversial history, as alluded
to above. In 1980, the party decided to create a window during
which its primaries could be held. 3 For 1984, the party decided to
grant specific exemptions to Iowa and New Hampshire, allowing
them to hold their primaries prior to the second Tuesday in March
and warning other states not to violate the window. 4 This exemp-
tion has continued to the present day and has expanded to include
the additional states of Nevada and South Carolina.5
B. The Michigan and Florida Experiments
In 2008, two states without exemptions challenged Democratic
rules by holding primaries prior to the first Tuesday in February.
Michigan and Florida, both hoping to exert greater influence on
the nominating process, changed state law to move up to earlier
dates.8 6 While the Republicans, per their rule, took only half of
those states' delegates, the Democrats initially decided to strip all
convention delegates from those states. 7 Though the Democrats
did decide to reinstate each state's delegates with half their votes,
the damage had already been done to Michigan and Florida's at-
tempts to impact the outcome; indeed, the plan to reinstate the
delegates was adopted with the unambiguous intent to have no
88impact on the nomination. The experiences in Michigan and
Florida demonstrate the entrenchment that Iowa and New Hamp-
shire have achieved.
Michigan, hoping that presidential candidates would pay atten-
tion to its poor economy, decided to move up its 2008 presidential
primary to January 15.8' Leading Michigan Democrats described
the move as a war on the way Americans select presidential candi-
dates, and attacked the privileged role of Iowa and New
82. See Part IC, supra.
83. PALMER, supra note 27, at 137.
84. DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 1984 DEMOC-
RATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, Rule 10A (1982). Note also the March date for the start of
the 1984 primaries, which emphasizes the significant movement toward front-loading.
85. Cillizza & Goldfarb, supra note 70.
86. Zito, supra note 1.
87. Id.
88. Seelye & Zeleny, supra note 2.
89. Dawson Bell,Jan. 15 Primary Gets the Go-Ahead, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov. 22, 2007,
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Hampshire. 90 They argued that Michigan was being bullied by the
national party in order to maintain Iowa and New Hampshire's
lock on the process.9' After the state announced the change and it
was ratified by the Michigan Supreme Court, however, many lead-
ing Democratic presidential candidates, in an attempt to placate
Iowa and New Hampshire voters and the national party establish-
ment, had their names removed from the ballot.92 Even before
that, all of the major Democratic candidates had already made a
pledge not to campaign in Michigan if the primary was held on
January 15 . Consequently, despite Michigan's efforts to gain equal
footing with respect to presidential nominations, and likely be-
cause of it, the role of its Democratic primary in the nomination
process was significantly diminished.
Florida, meanwhile, faced a similar situation, with only slightly
better results. Before Michigan changed its date, Florida selected a
January 29, 2008 primary date, and the Democratic National
Committee ("DNC") voted to strip Florida of all of its delegates.94
The DNC made the decision even though the primary date change
was passed by a Republican-controlled legislature and using an al-
ternate date would have cost the state party millions of dollars.95
Democratic presidential candidates, as they did in Michigan,
signed a pledge to boycott the Florida primary at the urging of
party leaders in the four exempted early states. 6 They did not,
however, remove their names from the ballot.97 That, combined
with the intense campaigning of the major candidates' support-
ers-if not the candidates' official campaigns-meant that the
Florida primary possessed greater relevance for the Democratic
race than the Michigan primary.9 Nonetheless, with no delegates
90. Brian Dickerson, Michigan Fuels a Political Revolution, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 5,
2007, at IA.
91. Id.
92. Bell, supra note 89. A notable exception was Hillary Clinton. Her name remained
on the ballot, adding to the controversy when the Democratic Party was deciding what to do
with the Michigan and Florida delegates.
93. Dickerson, supra note 90.
94. Michael D. Shear, DNC Strips Florida of 2008 Delegates, WASH. PosT, Aug. 26, 2007, at
Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/25/
AR2007082500275.html.
95. Id.
96. William March, States Shuffle Primaries in a Bid for Attention, Influence, TAMPA TRIB-
UNE, Sept. 26, 2007, at 1.
97. John M. Broder, Clinton Wins in Florida, But Without Any Delegates to Sweeten the Vic-
tory, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/
us/politics/30dems.html?.
98. Id. The Democratic candidates did attempt to circumvent the boycott in some re-
spects, though they did not break the official boycott. Notably, Clinton publicly proclaimed
that she would work to seat the Florida and Michigan delegations, and she was in Florida when
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to claim and no serious campaigning there (both the result of the
early states' monopoly on the process), Florida's role was signifi-
cantly diminished.
It is worth noting that, although Michigan and Florida were ini-
tially stripped entirely of their delegates by the Democratic Party
for voting too early and were later only able to receive reinstate-
ment for half of their votes, the exempted states also broke party
rules by holding their contests earlier than the dates listed in the
Democratic Rules.99 Nonetheless, the party did not punish the ex-
empted states for violating the rules. This selective enforcement
raises questions about the party's interest in enforcement generally.
C. Proposals for Reform
Many commentators have proposed alternative fixes to the cur-
rent process of selecting presidential nominees. Such proposals are
aimed at both the front-loading problem and the early state ex-
emption problem, but I will focus on the latter. I will only discuss
several representative proposals, which is sufficient to demonstrate
how one might structure a better system. None of these proposals
has received serious consideration, and this fact highlights the dif-
ficulty in achieving a political solution to the problem.
One plan, which the Republican Party very nearly adopted in
2000, is called the Delaware Plan, or "small states first" plan. 00 Un-
der this plan, the primary season would be spread out over four
months, with the thirteen smallest states going in the first month
and progressing to the twelve largest states' primaries in month
four.'0' Although this plan eliminates the stronghold maintained by
the four exempt states, it creates its own inequality. Therefore,
even if this plan is possible to achieve, it is still objectionable under
the standard set forth below.
2
the doors closed. The Clinton campaign, meanwhile, accused Obama of appealing to Florida
voters by funding national cable ads that appear in Florida. Brian C. Mooney, forida Primary
Results Might Prove Difficult to Ignore, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 2008, at A12, available at
http://wv.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/01/29/floridaprimary-resultsmight-
provedifficult-to.jgnore/.
99. 2008 Presidential Nomination Calendar, USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/politics/election2008/nomination-calendar.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
100. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 105-09.
101. Id.
102. See infta Part IV.D,. The Delaware Plan might be less objectionable than our cur-
rent system, however, as the parties' interests in promoting retail politics are more
legitimately exercised in this case. Under the current system, parties exercise those interests
in an arbitrary manner by privileging specific states without regard to neutral factors. None-
theless, the Delaware Plan remains problematic.
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A key alternative to the Delaware Plan is the so-called "California
Plan."10 3 Also called the Graduated Random Presidential Primary
System, the plan randomly generates a primary calendar, while en-
suring that the schedule is spread out over ten, two-week intervals,
and allowing for fewer delegates to be selected in the first few
weeks so as to guarantee retail politicking. 10 4 Although this plan has
many benefits, 0 5 such a radical change is unlikely to occur absent a
significant outside influence, such as a Supreme Court ruling.
Over the years, numerous Congressional proposals sought to re-
form the presidential nominating process.' 6 The most notable
recent effort was undertaken by Minnesota Senator Amy Klobu-
char, with "tri-partisan" support.0 7 Klobuchar's plan is for a rotating
regional primary, where four regions would alternate every four
years to host primaries during different months of the campaign. °s
States could hold their primaries within a seven-day window during
their region's month.'0 9 Congressional efforts to enact such
changes, however, are problematic-beyond even the great diffi-
culty of reaching legislative consensus-because federalism
concerns may mean that Congress does not have the power to
force the states into such a system. 1]° Thus, in addition to the po-
litical difficulties involved in a uniform plan,"' constitutional
difficulties further cloud the picture."'
103. Thomas Gangale, The California Plan: A 21st Century Method for Nominating Presiden-
tial Candidates, 37 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 81 (2004).
104. Id. at 82-83.
105. It is not, of course, a perfect plan, as it suffers from the same problem of geo-
graphic disbursement that troubled some observers of the Delaware Plan. See, e.g., MAYER &
BUSCH, supra note 35, at 107.
106. William G. Mayer& Andrew E. Busch, Can the Federal Government Reform the Presiden-
tial Nomination Process, 3 EIECTION L.J. 613, 613-14 (2004).
107. Nina Petersen-Perlman, Klobuchar Leads Effort to End 'Primary Arms Race', MINNEA-
POLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Sept. 20, 2007, at 6A; see also Regional Presidential Primary and Caucus
Act, S. 1905, 110th Cong. (2007).
108. S. 1905, 110th Cong. (2007).
109. Id.
110. MAYER & BusciH, supra note 106, at 614-19. It is substantially certain that New
Hampshire would challenge federal primary legislation on such grounds. But cf Burroughs
v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545-47 (1934) (holding that Congress has the power to pro-
tect the integrity of the presidential election process in order to protect the government
from impairment or destruction).
111. Senators and Representatives from the early states would likely invest significant
political capital in blocking any significant change.
112. The constitutionality of federal regulation of presidential primaries does, indeed,
constitute an interesting question. Insofar as it is a question of whether the federal govern-
ment can impose its will on the states, a short discussion here will do. Burroughs contains
strong language regarding the right of Congress to regulate the presidential selection proc-
ess, but it is in the context of a federal corruption statute. 290 U.S. at 545-47. That situation
is different from a federal statute creating equal power among states in the nomination
process because the integrity of the federal government is not directly implicated in the
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Other potential transformational primary plans could include a
national primary,"'3 an "interregional primary" plan,"' or a "bal-
anced primary.""5
More incremental plans are also a possibility, both to combat
front-loading and to eliminate the privileged position of Iowa, New
Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina. For example, the parties
might tie incentives to states' selection of certain primary dates.' 6
The parties could allow later states to have winner-take-all prima-
ries, while earlier states would have to give delegates in proportion
to the vote." 7 Or the parties could apply a tiered system of what the
Republicans already do, granting more delegates to later states for
each step back they take in the primary season.
In the end, however, none of the above plans are likely to take
root, given the stranglehold the early states have on the process. As
noted earlier,"' the parties are unlikely to address the problems of
front-loading without solving the early primary problem. Meanwhile,
the early states have sufficient leverage to retain their exclusive posi-
tions." 9 Those dynamics could change, but a successful legal assault
latter situation. Justice Hugo Black's plurality opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell also provides
support for Congress' power; he wrote that Congress possesses "ultimate supervisory power"
over both congressional and presidential elections. 400 U.S. 112, 123-24 (1970). On the
other hand, it is far from clear that the Constitution should be read to give Congress power
to bind the states with respect to presidential primaries. MAYER & BuscH, supra note 35, at
134-35. Regardless, the issue is not settled and has little bearing on this Note's primary
question: Do the states have the power to force the parties to accept delegates selected in
violation of party rules that treat the various states differently?
113. See JOHN HASKELL, FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED: UNDERSTANDING AND REFORMING
PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES 73-76 (1996). A uniform national primary date, of course, would
completely change the nature of the nomination process by eliminating the focus on retail
politics and disadvantaging lesser-known candidates. The parties would be reluctant to make
such a change for a variety of reasons, including a lack of momentum-building and the huge
advantage it creates for better-known, but not necessarily more electable, candidates. I am
willing to concede that parties have an interest in having the primary season spread out over
the calendar, but that interest should be circumscribed when the party uses means that dis-
criminate among states.
114. See, e.g., Interregional Presidential Primary and Caucus Act, H.R. 1523, 110th
Cong. (2007).
115. See Stuart Jones, A Better Way to Choose a President, http://politicalgrind.com/
2008/01/08/a-better-way-to-choose-a-president/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
116. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 114-16.
117. Id.
118. See Part IA, supra.
119. Their leverage extends not only over the party, but also over candidates and poten-
tial candidates. Candidates do not want to upset voters in Iowa and New Hampshire by
supporting efforts to supplant those states. Doing so would approach political suicide if the
efforts proved unsuccessful. Candidates also plan their activities for years ahead of time and
invest many resources in cultivating support in the early states. Eliminating Iowa and New
Hampshire's special positions would upset their expectations.
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would likely prove more effective-and, in any event, quicker-in
undercutting the early states' positions.
Political scientist Larry Sabato concedes that a political solution
is impossible, largely because of Iowa and New Hampshire's hell-
bent stance on their privileged positions. 20 He argues that the cur-
rent constitutional structure "ignores the politics of the system
almost entirely," concluding the structure must be changed by con-
stitutional amendment.121 Consequently, he proposes an
amendment to create a regional lottery plan.12 1 While Sabato is cor-
rect that the Constitution fails to address the problem, he fails to
consider the possibility that a change in how the Supreme Court
interprets the present Constitution could change the political dy-
namics and knock Iowa and New Hampshire off their perch. Even
so, Sabato unwittingly proposes a guiding principle that the Court
can use as the basis for reform: "Every state and region ought to
have essentially an equal chance, over time, to influence the out-
come of the parties' presidential nominations, and thus the
selection of presidents.'
23
III. PARTY ASSOCIATIONAL RIGHTS AND THE LAW
Given the difficulty of a political solution, 24 and assuming that a
constitutional amendment would similarly prove too difficult to
usher through Congress and receive state ratification, a solution
will require court intervention. Although this route is not impossi-
ble, Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past thirty-five years
creates a difficult landscape for a constitutional challenge to the
parties' stranglehold on the rules of presidential nominations. This
Part discusses the current landscape, whereas recommendations
120. LarryJ. Sabato, Politics: America's Missing Constitutional Link, VA. Q. REv., Summer
2006, at 149. Sabato argues that the incentives for Senators and Representatives from the
early states, combined with the presidential ambitions of many Senators, would effectively
end any serious effort. Id. at 155-56.
121. Id. at 157; see also infra Part III.A.
122. Sabato's proposal is similar to Klobuchar's, in that he proposes that the nation be
divided into four regions, but he differs by allowing states to choose any day within that
region's month for their primary and also by choosing the order of regions by lottery, rather
than alternation. Sabato, supra note 120, at 158-61.
123. Id. at 156.
124. Again, we will set aside discussion of the constitutionality of a political solution. It
is worth noting, however, that the party associational rights discussed in this Part would have
bearing on that issue. Nonetheless, that does not mean that the analysis would be the same.
As Part TV will argue, states have additional interests in protecting their citizens and in se-
lecting a President that are different from the federal government's interests.
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for the application and modification of constitutional jurispru-
dence are reserved for later.'
25
A. Constitutional Silence
As anyone who has taken a high school American history course
knows, key Founding Fathers opposed the idea of political parties;
consequently, the Constitution makes no provision for their exis-
tence or regulation. This has created interpretive difficulties, as
courts have had to rely on ill-suited constitutional clauses to apply
to controversies involving the parties. Indeed, one commentator
has described constitutional silence as a "clear case of constitu-
tional failure."
26
First Amendment law is a complex subject, and its application to
private organizations in general remains outside the scope of this
Note. It is sufficient to state that private organizations enjoy sub-
stantial freedom from governmental interference, including for
actions intended to influence our political system. 27 This freedom
also sensibly extends to partisan political organizations with respect
to the right to associate with individuals of similar political persua-
sion.12s Courts have also held that party rights to associate with
particular viewpoints are protected, even in the face of opposing
individual First Amendment rights.2 9 It is thus well-established that
the rights of private organizations should not be limited simply by
the fact that they are trying to elect individuals to government; this
makes sense, so long as they do not conflict with compelling state
interests.
One key consideration, however, suggests a different analysis
when party interests run up against state interests: The party's rela-
tionship with government is fundamentally different from most
125. See infra Part IV.
126. Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 312 (2001).
127. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); DeJonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937).
128. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986).
129. E.g., Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1235 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Georgia
Republican Party could refuse to list David Duke on the state's presidential primary ballot
on the grounds that Duke held "adverse political principles"); Republican Party of Tex. v.
Dietz, 940 S.W.2d 86, 92-93 (Tex. 1997) (holding under Texas Constitution that the party
could refuse to allow Log Cabin Republicans to participate in the formulation of its internal
party platform); see also Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
224 (1989) (holding that a party has the right to "select a standard bearer who best repre-
sents the party's ideologies and preferences" (quoting Ripon Soc., Inc. v. Nat'l Republican
Party, 525 E2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975))).
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private organizations, in that its operations are necessarily linked
to state elections. While it makes sense to vigorously protect parties
as private organizations promoting particular viewpoints, it is less
clear that they deserve-and, indeed, receive-constitutionally-
protected freedom when it comes to the processes that elect candi-
dates.13 0 The cases discussed below" give parties some strong
associational rights in these settings, but the parties' quasi-public
character renders the Constitution essentially silent with respect to
the core conflict. Consequently, party autonomy from government
regulation of primary election processes is not sacrosanct or abso-
lute.
B. State Regulation of Primary Elections, Generally
In recent years, the Supreme Court has given political parties
wide associational latitude to organize and dictate the rules of their
primaries, insulated from state laws to the contrary. Indeed, the
Court has protected the major parties from attacks on their asso-
ciational rights on most occasions. 1 2 In addition to the cases
bearing directly on presidential primaries discussed below, 33 the
Court has addressed a series of cases regarding parties' rights to
determine the rules for participation in primaries.
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut3 4 is a key case in the de-
velopment of party associational rights. In that case, the state
Republican Party challenged a Connecticut law that required that
only party members could vote in a party primary. 13 5They had at-
tempted to change the law in the state legislature, but
Democrats-presumably to marginalize the Republicans by pre-
venting moderating independent voters from voting in the
primaries-blocked the move.1 36 Despite the state's claim that its
law was narrowly tailored to advance legitimate state interests in
the integrity of elections and to prevent party raiding, the Supreme
Court held the law violated the Republicans' associational rights.
1 3 7
The Court said that the Constitution protects "[tlhe Party's deter-
130. See Issacharoff, supra note 126, at 285-90.
131. See infra Part I1I.B-C.
132. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 137-38.
133. See infra Part III.C.
134. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
135. Id. at211.
136. ld. at 212.
1.t7 Id at 224-25
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mination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the struc-
ture which best allows it to pursue its political goals."
13
The Court made even stronger statements in support of party as-
sociational rights in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee.13 Therein, the Democratic Party challenged a California
law that banned parties from making primary endorsements and
dictated internal procedures of the parties. 4 Justice Marshall's ma-
jority opinion struck down the laws on First Amendment
association grounds.' 4' Eu constituted an easy case, where the state's
flimsy justifications ran up against strong party interests in basic
self-governance and speech. Nonetheless, the Court's decision on
the party self-governance issue is important. 42 On the other hand,
and offering important support for my argument, the Court in Eu
did recognize a line of case law allowing states to interfere with
party internal affairs when a compelling state interest is impli-
cated. 143 The Court, in Storer v. Brown, 44 pointed out the necessity of
state involvement in elections, including primary elections:
" [T] here must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to
be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is
to accompany the democratic processes." 45 Because current party
rules influence an arbitrary result, this statement outlining the
main legitimate purposes for state regulation provides support for
intervention.
The most recent significant iteration of party associational rights
comes in California Democratic Party v. Jones.146 In Jones, the Court
struck down California's "blanket primary" 147 on First Amendment
grounds.4 " The driving force behind the opinion was the Court's
desire to protect a party from being forced to associate with voters
138. Id.
139. 489 U.S. 214, 222-25, 229-33 (1989).
140. Id. at 216.
141. Id. at 233.
142. Professor Issacharoff has argued that Eu is primarily a decision protecting avenues
of speech. Issacharoff supra note 126, at 288-89. In doing so, however, he completely ignores
the part of the decision striking down the regulation of the party's internal affairs. Despite
his protestations, Eu clearly acknowledges a right of party association with respect to institu-
tional affairs.
143. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231-33; see, e.g., Am. Party ofTex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974)
(holding that a state can force parties to use primaries to select nominees); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (holding that a state may interfere with a party's internal affairs if
needed to make elections fair and honest).
144. 415 U.S. 724.
145. Id. at 730.
146. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
147. A "blanket primary" is a primary where voters can choose to vote in different par-
ties' primaries for different offices.
148. 530 U.S. at 586.
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who would not even identify with the party on the day of the elec-
tion.4 9 As in Tashjian and Eu, the Court did not find the state's
proffered interests sufficient to justify the incursion.'50 Nonetheless,
the Court did recognize that fairness could be a compelling state
interest in regulating political parties, given the right circum-
stances.' 5' Taken together, these three cases make it clear that,
although the state and party necessarily must work together in the
primary context, state regulation of core party activities is generally
not allowed absent a compelling state interest.
The White Primary Cases 52 provide the contrary view of party as-
sociational rights. Those cases dealt with a variety of efforts by
Democrats in the South to exclude blacks from the candidate se-
lection process by effectively declaring the party to be public in
that context. 5 3 Among the cases, Smith v. Allwright made the most
significant holding with respect to bringing parties within the pur-
view of states: The party conducts primary elections "under state
statutory authority," and that statutory system makes the party an
"agency of the state" for the purposes of the election, so the state
can impose duties that are public in nature-in that case, constitu-
tional duties-in the setting of primary elections. 54 In other words,
parties are public entities in the context of primary elections.
This broad understanding of the White Primary Cases simply does
not hold up in light of the more recent decisions on party associa-
tional rights. Nor should it be surprising that the courts have
limited their continued application. The broad implications of
classifying otherwise private entities as completely public in the
context of primary elections has led scholars and judges to seek
various ways of limiting the scope of the White Primary Cases.
55
Nonetheless, the cases can-and should-be read in light of the
more recent precedent to hold that party activities relating to pri-
mary elections are at least quasi-public, such that the state has
149. See id. at 581-82.
150. Id. at 582-86.
151. Id. at 584-85.
152. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
153. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A Skeptical In-
quiry, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1741, 1748 (1993).
154. 321 U.S. at 663-65.
155. Ellen D. Katz, Resurrecting the White Primary, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 325, 333-35 (2004).
In fact, Jones distinguished the White Primary Cases on the grounds that they required the
Fifteenth Amendment to become state action. Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567,
572-73 (2000). That argument, of course, makes no sense, as the state is acting the same
regardless of whether the party is practicing discrimination or not.
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strong interests in the process, particularly when the party has a
discriminatory purpose.156
C. State Regulation of Presidential Primaries
The Supreme Court has also decided several cases directly bear-
ing on a national party's decision as to whether to seat delegates
chosen by means violating party rules. These cases, although dis-
tinguishable, provide a major roadblock to invalidating the
Democratic Party's unfair rules. Consequently, I will discuss them
in some depth in order to lay the groundwork for a departure from
the course they set.
Cousins v. Wigoda157 is the case that changed the tide toward
greater party associational rights, and it is important in the presi-
dential primary context.5 The case arose when, in 1972, Chicago
Democratic voters elected a group of delegates to represent them
at the Democratic National Convention, but another slate of dele-
gates challenged the seating of the first group of delegates because
the Chicago election had violated party rules. 59 The national party
agreed with the challenge and refused to seat the first group of
delegates in favor of the challenging group, despite a Cook County
court ruling enjoining the challenging group from acting as dele-
gates.' 6° The Supreme Court agreed with the national party; even
though the state had an interest in the integrity of its electoral proc-
esses and in effective suffrage for its citizens, the Court held that that
interest did not carry over to the Democratic Convention because of
156. Courts and scholars have spilled significant ink on the issue of state action in the
primary election context. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1118-21 (2d. ed. 1988); MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 106, at 619-23; Lowenstein, supra note
153, at 1747-54. I do not add to that discussion because the issue I address is not whether
the parties are acting as agents of the state, but whether a state can impose certain require-
ments on the parties. The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized this distinction. See
Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (no mention of
state action requirement); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (same).
157. 419 U.S. 477.
158. MAYER & BUSCH, supra note 35, at 137.
159. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 480.
160. Id. at 480-81. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether the
elected delegates could force the national party to seat them at the Convention, as the
elected delegates had conceded that they could not. Id. at 488. While that conclusion seems
reasonable in the context of Cousins, it is less clear in the present instance, where party rules
provide for seating of delegates from some states under substantially the same circum-
stances. Thus, the party's associational rights are arguably less burdened in the present case,
and the party could be forced to accept all delegates selected in a similar way on a "take it or
leave it" basis. See infra Part IV.
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the national nature of the selection of presidential candidates. 6 ' Be-
cause states do not have a constitutional role in the selection of
candidates, the Court effectively held that they had no interest in
light of the "pervasive national interest in the selection of candi-
dates for national office.' 62
Despite the Court's strong language on the subject, the context
of the case makes its applicability to the Democratic Party rules re-
garding primary dates limited. In Cousins, the Court was concerned
about each state trying to impose its own rules on the national
party: "If the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to National
Political Party Conventions were left to state law 'each of the fifty
states could establish the qualifications of its delegates to the vari-
ous party conventions without regard to party policy, an obviously
intolerable result.' ,,163 Even though states should not be allowed to
overrule generally applicable party delegate selection rules, it does
not follow that parties should be allowed to apply different rules to
different states. Consequently, Cousins does not definitively end the
discussion.
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Cousins would have reached
the same result, although he would have used less sweeping lan-164
guage. He would not have downplayed the state's interest as
much as the majority, but simply would have held the interest in-
sufficient to support "a total restriction" on the right of the
contesting group to assemble and seek the national party's ap-
proval as delegates. 65 Rehnquist flatly rejected the majority's
contention that states had no role in the process, as the states
"have residual authority in all areas not taken from them by the
Constitution or by validly enacted congressional legislation."
66
Both the majority and concurrence in Cousins make mention
of' 67 O'Brien v. Brown,"8 a case decided several years earlier. O'Brien
concerned the same Illinois delegate dispute (as well as an addi-
tional one), but in the context of a constitutional challenge to the
Credentials Committee's refusal to seat delegates.' 69 The Court re-
jected the constitutional challenge on the grounds that "for nearly
a century and a half the national political parties themselves have
determined controversies regarding the seating of delegates to
161. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-90.
162. Id. at 490.
163. Id. (quoting Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F. Supp. 82, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1972)).
164. Id. at 491-92.
165. Id. at 492.
166. Id. at 495-96.
167. Id. at 491,494.
168. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
169. Id. at 2-5.
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their conventions. If this system is to be altered by federal courts in
the exercise of their extraordinary equity powers, it should not be
done under the circumstances and time pressures surrounding the
actions. ' '1v° The Cousins majority clearly distinguished the facts of
O'Brien: "Whatever the case of actions presenting claims that the
Party's delegate selection procedures are not exercised within the
confines of the Constitution [as in O'Brien] this is a case where '...
the convention itself (was) the proper forum for determining intra-
party disputes as to which delegates (should) be seated.' ,'71 In
other words, the Court did not pass final judgment on whether
delegate selection rules could be subject to constitutional attack,
and that remains an open question. O'Brien and Cousins'discussion
of O'Brien serve to emphasize that the Court has not held that na-
tional party conventions are wholly private in nature and thus
immune from state regulation.
72
Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follettev17 provides
another example of a national party's strong rights with respect to
seating-and, indeed, not seating-delegates in the face of state
attempts to dictate the process. Under Wisconsin law, delegates to
national party conventions were selected in an open primary, but
Democratic Party rules at the time forbade states from requiring
that delegates to their convention vote according to the results of a
primary open to non-Democrats.'7 4 Thus, there was an inherent
conflict between the Wisconsin law and Democratic rules. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged the Democratic Party's
associational rights, but held that the burden on those rights was
justified in light of the state's compelling interest in maintaining its
primary. '
75
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, holding that "[a] political party's choice among various ways
of determining the makeup of a State's delegation to the party's
national convention is protected by the Constitution.' ' 176 The Court
also rejected the state's proffered interest in holding an open pri-
mary as a justification for requiring the national party to seat the
170. Id. at 5.
171. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 491 (quoting O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 4).
172. At least one Court of Appeals has, however, concluded that some constitutional re-
quirements do not apply to national party conventions. See Ripon Soc., Inc. v. Nat'l
Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that one-person, one-vote
does not apply to a party's formula for allocating delegates).
173. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
174. Id. at 109-10.
175. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party of U.S., 287 N.W2d 519, 541 (Wis.
1980).
176. LaFollette, 450 U.S. at 124.
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delegates; although the state has an interest in holding an open
primary, that interest does not extend to allow the state to dictate
that the national party must accept delegates bound by the pri-
mary. '77 Taken on its face, La Follette provides parties wide discretion
in refusing to seat delegates.
Justice Powell authored a dissent in which he argues the Democ-
ratic Party's associational rights are not substantially burdened.1
7
1
Significantly, Powell pointed out the wide array of procedures that
party rules allowed for delegate selection, including caucuses and
allowing voters to change party affiliatioh with little or no effort
before and after the primary; thus, refusing to accept delegates
chosen in an open primary is hard to justify as vital to protect the
party's associational rights.7 9 Even if Powell is wrong on this point,
his argument is more compelling in the context of party regulation
of presidential primary dates, where the party has already decided
to accept delegates selected early. Powell goes on to stress
important state interests as well, noting that "a continuing accom-
modation of the interests of the parties with those of the States and
their citizens"' s makes sense and is suggested by history."'
As the reader may have gleaned from the preceding cases, the
Supreme Court tends to view state regulation of parties, particu-
larly party decisions regarding the seating of delegates, with
skepticism. Nonetheless, the cases as a whole make out a two-part
test in determining whether state or party constitutional interests
prevail.'12 First, the court must evaluate the burden of state regula-
tion on the party's constitutional rights.'83 Second, the court must
177. Id. at 124-26.
178. Id. at 128-34.
179. Id. at 133.
180. Id. at 137.
181. Id. at 134-37. The Court's decision in La Follette is open to attack on other grounds.
Most notably, the Court asserts that the issue of "whether [a] state may compel the National
Party to seat a delegation chosen in a way that violates the rules of the Party" was resolved in
Cousins. Id. at 121. The Court mistakenly believed that the trial court in Cousins had en-
joined the Democratic Party "from refusing to seat delegates selected in a manner in accord
with state law." Id. (emphasis added). Of course, the trial court in Cousins actually enjoined
the party from seating delegates in a manner in violation of state law. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419
U.S. 477, 480-81 (1975). Thus, La Follette is based on an improper reading of the relevant
precedent. Even though the ruling in Cousins seems to compel the conclusion that the La
Follette Court mistakenly draws from it, that is not necessarily so. In the context of presiden-
tial primaries, a party may be less burdened by being forced to seat delegates in a way that
the party accepts with respect to other states' delegates.
182. See La Follette, 450 U.S. at 128 (Powell,J., dissenting); see also, e.g., Cal. Democratic
Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 579-86 (2000); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 728-35 (1974); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960).
183. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 128 (Powell,J., dissenting).
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determine if the state has a compelling interest in regulation.8 4
This Note does not quarrel with the basic test. Rather, it proposes
that the Court modify the contours of the test to conform with
Justice Powell's pragmatic approach to the burden on parties, as
well as to better recognize state interests in parties treating them
fairly vis-A-vis other states. The Court should consider closely the
relative interests of the party and the state, rather than looking at
each in isolation.
IV. REVAMPING THE LAW APPLIED TO PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION CALENDARS
As is evident, the Supreme Court has set a high bar for states
wishing to regulate parties and their rules regarding presidential
primaries. Nonetheless, the Court has not directly addressed the
question of whether states may set primary dates that are contrary
to party rules, nor has it addressed that question in the specific set-
ting of party rules that discriminate in favor of certain states by
allowing them to hold early primaries without penalization. It is to
this question that we turn.
A. What the Court's Jurisprudence Means for Party
Rules Regarding Primary Dates
To begin, there is the relatively easy case of the Republican Party
rules, which require that states holding party primaries before a des-
ignated day are required to forgo half of their delegates to the
party's national convention.' s5 Under the two-part test, we first look
at the burden on the party's associational rights. Imagine the case
where a state, say Ohio, passed a law that moved the primary date up
prior to "Super Tuesday." In and of itself, that action is unobjection-
able. Imagine now that Ohio sues the national party to require them
to seat all of the delegates selected in the early primary. This second
action constitutes a direct conflict between the state and the party.
For the Republicans, the burden of this action does not seem in-
significant. The party certainly has an interest in preventing a
184. Id. Indeed, Cousins implicitly accepts such a test as the controlling one by engaging
in a detailed analysis of both the burden on the party and the state's proffered compelling
state interest. 419 U.S. at 488-90. The La Follette majority refused to evaluate the burden on
the party (though it did look at Wisconsin's proffered interest), therefore suggesting a shift
in the general test. 450 U.S. at 123-26. More recent cases, however, have reaffirmed the test
as the two-step process I have described. See Cal Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 579-86.
185. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 41, Rule 16(a).
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scenario where the nominee is selected too far before the general
election, as the party's preferences and candidates' electability may
change over time. It has chosen a cut-off date, which it has applied
to all state primaries, further indicating its strong interest.
The state's interest in regulating the Republican Party, mean-
while, is not very great, if it exists at all. Indeed, the state's motive,
gaining an advantage vis-a-vis other states in the selection of presi-
dential nominees, is not legitimate under the test of Storer, as it
creates more, not less, chaos.86 More important, though, is the
holding in Cousins that states have no interest protecting the right
of their citizens to effective suffrage or the integrity of the electoral
process in the primary election context.'8 7 Additionally, even if this
part of Cousins is overruled, as I will argue it should be,' the state's
interest is not strong here because its voters' effective suffrage is
not actually being disadvantaged in the nomination process vis-a-vis
other states. Consequently, the substantial burden on the party and
insubstantial interest of the state dictate a victory for the Republi-
can Rule, if challenged.
The Democratic Rules, which grant exemptions allowing four
favored states to hold early primaries,""' create a more difficult
question, although they would likely be upheld if challenged un-
der current law. Let us use the hypothetical involving Ohio again.
In one respect, the burden on Democratic Party's associational
rights is the same as the Republicans. The Democrats certainly
have an interest in setting a cutoff date for primaries, and the Ohio
law disrupts that interest. On the other hand, the fact that the De-
mocrats allow specified states to hold primaries before that date
suggests that their interest in the cutoff date they chose is not all
that strong. Or at least such an inference would be proper under
Justice Powell's dissent in La Follette.19" Moreover, the party interests
at stake in this case are different than in La Follette. Whereas in La
FolLette the party's core interest in limiting their association to like-
minded individuals to advance common political beliefs was at
186. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730. It also raises the concerns identified by the trial court in
Cousins about allowing fifty different sets of rules without any consolidating counter-force.
See 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975) (citing Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 E Supp. 82, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1972));
see also Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 10, 124-267 (1981)
(holding state's compelling interest in integrity of electoral process not substantial enough
tojustify intrusion in party's delegate selection process).
187. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 489-91.
188. See infra Part IV.D.
189. DEMOCRATIc RULES, supra note 9, Rule 1lA.
190. SeeLaFollette, 450 U.S. at 133 (Powell,J., dissenting).
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stake,191 the interest in limiting when individuals can associate is
less central to the party. The Court's majority opinion, however,
does not appear to leave much, if any, room for second-guessing:
"A political party's choice among the various ways of determining
the makeup of a State's delegation to the party's national conven-
tion is protected by the [First Amendment, and] the courts may
not interfere on the ground that they view a particular expression
as unwise or irrational." 192 Thus, although the burden on the
Democratic Party's interest in setting its rules regarding presiden-
tial primaries is arguably much smaller-and, consequently, the
party is less burdened-the Court's broad language in La Follette
requires that the Court find a significant burden here.
Just as the burden on the party would be found significant un-
der La Follette, a finding that the state's interest is compelling would
directly contradict the statement in Cousins that a state's "interest
in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be
deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to
the National Party Convention" and that the interest in effective
suffrage for residents cannot be compelling. 193 In La Follette, the
Court characterized Cousins as creating a near-absolute bar to find-
ing that a state has a compelling interest: "In Cousins ... nine
justices agreed that a State could not constitutionally compel a na-
tional political convention to seat delegates against its will.' 94 The
Courtjust does not believe that the state can have an interest in the
delegate selection process. Therefore, a court could not find the
state's interest in choosing an early primary date compelling with-
out violating precedent.
Of course, states in reality do have a strong interest in holding
early primaries. The attention that presidential candidates pay to
Iowa and New Hampshire, including by making policy concessions,
illustrates only part of the point. In addition to receiving attention
and special benefits, which do not create compelling state inter-
ests, early states also have the chance to significantly affect who
becomes the next president. States thus have an interest in not hav-
ing their citizens disadvantaged vis-;I-vis other states' in the selection
of presidential nominees. Therefore, the interest is not in voting
whenever they want, but in protecting their equality and the equality
of their citizens. Nonetheless, this interest carries no weight under
current doctrine. Cousins and La Follette taken together mean that a
191. Id. at 121-22. A party's right to associate, and the corollary right not to associate, is
well established. Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
192. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 124.
193. 419 U.S. at 491.
194. 450 U.S. at 125-26 n.31 (citing Cousins, 419 U.S. at 492).
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court would almost certainly hold for the Democratic Party in a
case challenging the party's refusal to seat delegates.
B. A Concrete Example: Nelson v. Dean
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area was put into ac-
tion in a case challenging the Democratic National Party's refusal
to seat delegates selected in Florida's early primary, Nelson v.
Dean.'9 The case provides an example of how the Court's jurisdic-
tion applies to the presidential nomination calendar situation. In
that case, the district court addressed a lawsuit by a group of indi-
viduals asking the court to force the national Democratic Party to
seat the delegates selected in the Florida presidential primary, the
date of which violated party rules.
96
In Nelson, the court acknowledged that a state's compelling in-
terest can override a party's First Amendment rights, but it did not
consider the burden on the party in balancing both sides' interests.
Instead, it relied on language from La Follette to apply an absolute
prohibition that "the state cannot 'constitutionally compel a na-
tional political convention to seat delegates against its will.' ,,0 The
court did, however, address whether the party had an interest in
the rules, the analysis of which roughly approximates an analysis of
the burden. Its compelling interest is in setting a schedule for pri-
mary contests and requiring compliance.'98 And intrusions on the
party's power to set its presidential nomination schedule may pose
a burden, depending on the circumstances. But, as in La Follette,
the opinion in Nelson does not attempt to evaluate whether the
party truly would be burdened by the regulation; the simple fact
that the party has made the rule is enough to immunize it from
challenge.'"
Plaintiffs had raised the issue that Cousins and La Follette involved
core associational rights of who to include in the party decision-
making process, whereas it is less important that the party choose
not to associate with delegates selected in a process whose only flaw
was that the votes were cast too soon.200 The district court dismissed
those arguments, asserting that associational rights allow the voter
195. 528 E Supp. 2d 1271 (N.D. Fla. 2007).
196. Id. at 1275-76. The fact that the lawsuit was filed by individuals raised state action
issues, but the court did not address those issues, moving instead to the familiar two-part
test. Id. at 1276-77.
197. Id. at 1279 (quoting LaFotiette, 450 U.S. at 126 n.31).
198. Id. at 1280.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1279.
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to "choose to associate, or not to associate, for reasons the holder
deems sufficient." 20 1 Under that reasoning, the party could refuse
to seat delegates that were selected in primaries held on a Wednes-
day. But the Supreme Court's refusal to delve into evaluating the
burden on parties leads to, even if it does not require, this conclu-
sion.
The district court also looked at whether the state had a compel-
ling interest in having its delegates seated, deciding that it did
not.2°2 Interestingly, the court found that Florida's interest in an
early primary date was less compelling than the state interests at
stake in Cousins, as the potential adverse effect on the national
party and other states is greater when a state changes its primary
date. °3 There are a number of problems with this finding. First, it is
hard to see the adverse effects on other states. Although moving up
the primary might give Florida a better position vis-A-vis other
states, such an action would do nothing to impede other states
from doing anything with respect to the primary, including making
their own changes. Second, the fact that the court acknowledges
that states are placed in a worse position by having other states go
earlier in the nomination season supports the very point that it
seeks to refute: States have a strong interest in having a good posi-
tion on the nomination calendar. Third, it is hard to see how the
adverse effect on the party is greater in a case where the state is
trying to hold a primary on a date that the party already allows for
other states than a case where the party refused to seat delegates
selected in a way that limited minority, women, and youth partici-
pation, among other problems.2 4 Nonetheless, the absolute rule in
Cousins means that, although the district court's evaluation of state
interest was wrong, its conclusion that the state's interest is not
compelling is undoubtedly required.
C. What Went Wrong in Party Associational Rights
The Supreme Court's creation of effective immunity for national
party conventions tips the balance of power too far in favor of the
parties and against state regulation.0 One major problem with the
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1278-79.
203. Id. at 1278.
204. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 479 n.1 (1975).
205. Professor Tribe has argued that the Court gave away too much in La Follette and
should have paid more attention to the "public influence of the political parties," given the
inextricable relationship between the parties and states. See TRIBE, supra note 156, at 1115.
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Court's jurisprudence is the absence of any investigation of the
burden of state regulation on the party. Instead, any regulation
that limits the party's ability to make decisions regarding its na-
tional convention, even arbitrary decisions, is deemed to
significantly burden party associational rights.
2 0 6
Indeed, the Court treats the party's associational rights as abso-
lute, absent a compelling state interest. The problem with this
broad conclusion is that it does not accurately reflect the burdens
actually placed on the party's associational interests. While forcing
a party to accept voters who do not share common beliefs cuts to
the core of associational interests, forcing a party to accept party
voters who cast their votes too early does not, especially when one
considers that the party has already allowed other party voters, dif-
ferent only in that they live in different states, to cast early votes.
The case is made even stronger by the fact that the early states are
similarly violating party rules, yet face no consequences. Interest-
ingly, the issues decided in Cousins and La Follette did not require
such sweeping language. In Cousins, the Democratic Party had re-
jected delegates selected using methods that were systematically
unfair to younger voters, minorities, and women.0 7 In La Follette,
the Democratic Party rejected delegates selected in a primary that
was open to voters who chose not to publicly associate themselves
with the party.0 s In both cases, the burden of state regulation forc-
ing the seating of delegates was arguably very high, so the Court's
broad language was unnecessary.
None of this is to suggest that the party does not have a signifi-
cant interest in creating a schedule for its presidential nomination
process. The party certainly does have such an interest, and allow-
ing states to set and enforce the schedule by legislative fiat would
unduly burden party rights. But it does not rise to the level of core
associational interests, which at least arguably should receive near
absolute protection. Rather, the burden on the party should be
evaluated in light of all the relevant circumstances. Moreover,
when the party decides to grant exceptions to the general rule,
those exceptions undercut the party's claim that state regulation
with similar effect creates a heavy burden. Thus, although Cousins
and La Follette may have been correctly decided on their facts, the
The La Follette Court's decision to minimize the weight given to state interests, though
precedent, seems unreasonable given the significant linkage between party and state.
206. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 123-24
(1981).
207. 419 U.S. at 479 n.1.
208. 450 U.S. at 109-13.
[VOL. 42:1
A Critique of Party Associational Rights
rule of those cases with respect to party burdens is not necessarily
justifiable in other circumstances.
Another problem with the Court's jurisprudence is in its
evaluation of compelling state interests. The Court does not see
what can be a compelling interest in the context of presidential
primaries, so it makes any interest by definition uncompelling.
The key move is a decoupling of the delegate-selecting stage from
the convention. Although the Court sees how the state can have
an interest in the delegate-selecting stage, that interest does not
carry over to having those delegates seated at the convention.
The closing passage in Justice Stewart's majority opinion in La
Follette illustrates the problem:
The State has a substantial interest in the manner in which its
elections are conducted, and the National Party has a substan-
tial interest in the manner in which the delegates to its
National Convention are selected. But those interests are not
incompatible, and ... both interests can be preserved. The
National Party rules do not forbid Wisconsin to conduct an
open primary. But if Wisconsin does open its primary, it can-
not require that Wisconsin delegates to the National Party
Convention vote there in accordance with the primary results,
if to do so would violate Party rules.00
In other words, the state has a compelling interest in holding its
primary in the manner it wishes, but it has little interest-and cer-
tainly not a compelling interest-in ensuring that the results of
that primary have any effect on the presidential nomination. This
argument is absurd, as Justice Powell pointed out, because the
whole point of the state holding a presidential primary is to select
delegates who will influence the nomination.2 '0 The Supreme
Court's error was in concluding that the state has no interest in
ensuring that its citizens' preferences are considered in the nomi-
nation process.
D. Balancing State and Party Rights: Recommendations for Reform
The problems that the presidential primary scheduling context
raises with respect to the Court's jurisprudence suggest that
changes are necessary. Although the two-part test evaluating party
209. Id. at 126.
210. Id. at 134.
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burdens and state interests is basically sound, the Court should
modify its application of that test to better reflect the interests at
stake and effect a balance between states and parties.
With respect to the burden on the party, the Court should not
insist that any and every regulation of parties regarding their na-
tional convention places a significant burden on parties. It should
take a more pragmatic approach. This is essentially justice Powell's
point in dissent in La Follette when he writes, "I would look closely
at the nature of the intrusion, in light of the association involved,
to see whether we are presented with a real limitation on First
Amendment freedoms." 21 We should not presume that state regu-
lation poses great risk to party associational rights. In the present
context of the nomination calendar, it appears that the burden on
party First Amendment freedoms is not great.
Although the party certainly has an associational interest in set-
ting its calendar, the party's own actions suggest that the actions of
Florida and Michigan do not burden that interest very much. First,
and most importantly, the Democratic Party has allowed other
states to hold early primaries. This suggests that the party's interest
in a cutoff date is not all that strong. Second, the history of the
situation suggests that a strong motivation for the party rules has
been fear of retaliation by Iowa and New Hampshire. 12 Therefore,
the party would actually have more freedom with respect to its cal-
endar if it were not allowed to play favorites. Finally, the party has
selectively enforced its calendar rules by allowing Iowa and New
Hampshire to go even earlier than their privileged dates set in the
rules. If the party wants to be able to set its own calendar, it should
have to adopt a rational plan that treats states fairly.
The Court should also re-examine its jurisprudence with respect
to state interests. One key change would be to recognize that the
state's interest in controlling the conduct of presidential primaries
is nearly meaningless without recognizing the related interest in
having delegates selected according to that nomination contest
211. Id.at130-31.
212. One might object that the tradition of holding early contests in Iowa and New
Hampshire should weigh in favor of the party's right to give them a privileged position. I
have two responses. First, there is not very strong evidence of a tradition. As noted, their
position was much a historical accident, and the Democratic Party fought and lost a tense
battle with New Hampshire in the early 1980s regarding the state's early primary. PALMER,
supra note 27, at 139-43. Twenty years is hardly time to create a tradition. Second, and more
important, tradition is not recognized as a factor in any cases where the court has evaluated
state regulations purported to burden party associational rights. Even if it were recognized,
it is hard to imagine how it could make a significant impact when considered alongside the
party's interest in regulating the selection of delegates and the state's interest in regulating
elections.
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actually seated at the convention. La Follette's holding to the con-
trary defies our sense of what an election is about and should be
overruled . It is equivalent to saying that, as long as the state elec-
tion procedures are followed, the state has no interest in making
sure that the winner of its primary vote-getter rather than the run-
ner-up (or no candidate at all) assumes office. While a state does
not have an interest in ensuring that a particular candidate is suc-
cessful, it does have an interest in making sure the views of its
citizens are effectuated. That interest should of course be limited
by the party associational rights at stake, but it should prevail when
the burden on parties is relatively small.
Cousins' similar holding, that states have no legitimate role in
the selection of presidential candidates, also seems flatly wrong
and should be overruled.1 4 It ignores the inextricable nature of the
relationship between parties and states. Parties participate in state-
run elections and operate within government. The eventual presi-
dent will make decisions having significant impacts on the states.
The Court's rule also ignores the role of states in the federal system
and in the ultimate selection of a president. States should be able
to protect their citizens from arbitrary vote deprivation, even in the
context of a presidential nomination contest, and every state ought
to have an equal shot to influence the process.
In essence, my proposal is to delve more deeply into the relative
burdens and interests in order to reach a better balance of power
between party and state. I think such a mode of analysis will lead to
robust-but not unlimited-First Amendment protections with
respect to regulations bearing on core party interests, such as sub-
stantive party values, as well as a more reasonable basis for inquiry
into less central interests, such as the nomination calendar. It rec-
ognizes that parties do have a strong interest in the methods used
to select delegates, including the prevention of front-loading and
the maintenance of a reasonable calendar. For example, a party
could enforce a generally applicable rule penalizing states for
holding primaries before or after a certain date by stripping some
or all of their convention delegates.
Under my proposal, the Republicans could maintain their pri-
mary season structure. As noted above,2 5 the burden of state
regulation on the Republicans' associational rights would be more
substantial because they have not made exceptions to their rule, and
the state's interest would be less substantial in their case because the
213. Id. at 126.
214. 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975).
215. See Part IVA, supra.
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party has treated all states the same. But the party's power would
no longer be unlimited. While the Republican Rules would likely
withstand an attack on the basis of the test I propose, the Democ-
ratic Rules would not pass when subjected to the balancing test
because the Democrats have not shown their interest in their rule
to be as strong and because the state has a greater interest in re-
ceiving equal treatment vis-A-vis other states. I think these different
outcomes would be the correct results.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note addresses one form of challenge to party rules regard-
ing the nomination calendar. Other avenues are possible,
including individual rights claims under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Nonetheless, I think that my proposal is preferable. It
provides a solution that allows parties to retain significant freedom
when their associational interests are at their apex, yet gives courts
a basis for limiting parties when they push the limits of their power
and "step on the foot" of a state's valid election-related interests.
Because Cousins and La Follette concerned more central party asso-
ciational rights, those cases may be decided the same way under
the framework I have proposed. Under my reform, however, the
Supreme Court would have to actually look at the situation and
understand what each side was trying to accomplish before reach-
ing a conclusion.
This is not to say that my proposal would not have larger impli-
cations beyond the presidential nomination context. Rather, it
might push the Court to adopt a more complex view of the rela-
tionship between states and parties more generally. That would be
a good thing. Our Constitution's silence on the issue has led to a
jurisprudence that, as I have alluded to, too readily applies stan-
dard First Amendment associational protections to a setting where
they are not appropriate. This Note recommends an approach that
better fits the realities of party-state relations.
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